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REVISITING TAKSIN AND THAKSIN: UNCEREMONIOUS EXITS 
AND 
THE MAKING OF NOSTALGIA IN THAI HISTORY
Despite vast research on Thai history, little is written about comparative 
historical leadership, especially comparison between royalty and 
commoner. King Taksin (1767-1782) and former Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra1 (2001 -2006) share more than a similar-sounding 
name. Both were partly Chinese and originate from Tak and Chiang 
Mai respectively  peripheral cities far from the capital of old Siam and 
modern Thailand. Both king and prime minister were very successful 
initially. They introduced various reforms and changes to the kingdom’s 
politics and economy. In 1767, Taksin rebuilt the Siamese Kingdom in 
Thonburi from the ashes of the Burmese sacking of Ayutthaya. Similarly, 
in 2001, Thaksin restored modern Thailand after the Asian Financial 
Crisis left the kingdom in an economic mess and tatters. The main 
argument of this article analyses the reasons for Taksin and Thaksin’s 
unceremonious exits. Their sudden departures created a vacuum; and 
with a sense of a “deficient present”; these conditions contributed to 
the need to revisit the “better times”, and thus the making of nostalgia. 
Relooking at some historical and contemporary sources, this article 
traces Taksin and Thaksin, their rise, fall and the nostalgia that surround 
these two leaders of old Siam and modern Thailand. Comparing an 18th 
century king with a 20th century prime minister, this article opens the 
research to re-appraisals of traditional Thai historiography in a more 
contemporary perspective. 
Keywords: Thai History, Taksin, Thaksin, Siam, Sino-Thai, Thailand and 
Nostalgia
Introduction
On April 6, 1782, Chaophraya Chakri  who would soon-to-be-crowned King 
Rama I Phra Buddhayotfa Chulaloke (1782-1809)  marched victoriously into 
Bangkok on the back of a white elephant. Rama I’s entry marked the beginning 
of the Chakri Dynasty and the ultimate end of the short-lived King Taksin 
or Taksin Maharach of Thonburi (1767-1782). Fast forward to 2006, General 
Sonthi Boonyaratglin marched across Bangkok. Instead of a white elephant, 
Sonthi sent his lieutenants in army tanks and American-made Humvees to the 
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Ananda Samakhom Throne Hall in Dusit, the royal quarter of Bangkok. On 
that faithful September 19 night, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra put on a 
valiant fight, declaring martial law on Thai Channel Nine from the distant New 
York City, United States of America. Within hours, the Thaksin era that began 
on February 9, 2001, came to a sudden end about six years later. 
Comparing King and Prime Minister is a theme seldom explored 
in Thai history. No commoner, even a strongman like Field Marshall Plaek 
Phibun Songkram (more on this later), has ever been elevated to a comparison 
with royalty or a monarch. This article breaks the convention, by exploring 
a comparison of King Taksin and Prime Minister Thaksin. This article aims 
to revisit two well-known personalities by highlighting that both Taksin and 
Thaksin not only shared similar-sounding names but their paths crossed in 
one way too many. After the 2006 coup, the “Red Shirt” supporters of Thaksin 
started to liken their deposed prime minister as the modern version of Taksin 
who they believed was unceremoniously dethroned in 1782.2 The comparison 
even takes on metaphysical aspect, some of the Red Shirts believe Thaksin 
to be a reincarnation or a spiritual emanation of Taksin. Both strong men 
represented different eras, but they shared a similar dream of changing and 
reshaping the Thai kingdom. Although they brought progress and new ideas, 
they rumbled too much of the existing foundations that led to their untimely 
and unceremonious exits.  It is in their exits that they created a longing for an 
era long gone, and thus, the making of nostalgia. 
The idea of nostalgia can be traced to 17th century Swiss medical 
student, Johannes Hofer who coined the term, combining the Greek-language 
words of nostos (to return), and algia (a longing painful condition). Hofer 
noticed a form of homesickness among the Swiss mercenaries when they 
served abroad. The soldiers showed symptoms of loss of appetite, fatigue, and 
a general sense of sadness and hopelessness. Hofer wrote, no medical diagnose 
could be made, instead it was “nostalgia” that is to be blamed. Another common 
form of nostalgie was popularized by the returning immigrants from Algeria 
to France in the 1950s.  To the returned-migrants, French by descent but born 
and grew up in Africa  returning to France resulted in a melancholic regret of 
leaving one’s birthplace.  
This article focuses on the metamorphosis of nostalgia from a 
medical physical condition or disease among displaced soldiers to a more 
physiological condition of recapturing an event or personality of the past, more 
akin to those experienced by the returned French migrants. Simply defined, 
“historical nostalgia” is the remembrance of the past.  More specifically, 
historians Christopher Shaw and Malcom Chase have defined that the making 
of nostalgia can be attributed to three factors, a secular and linear sense of time; 
the apprehensions of the failings of the present, and finally the availability of 
the past such as objects, buildings and images from the past to become the 
talisman to link to the past.3 In this sense, this article attempts to view both 
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Taksin and Thaksin as talismans of the past and how their sudden departure 
coupled with present deficiencies created a longing for a bygone era. This 
article traces the inter-connectedness between nostalgia and the leaders’ sudden 
removal and how that shaped and transformed Thai history. More importantly, 
why and how nostalgia contributes to problematic memories of the kingdom 
in Southeast Asian history.   
King Taksin (1767-1782)
The story of Taksin begins in 1767 when Ayutthaya was in ruins. After the 
complete sacking of the ancient capital of Siam by marauding Burmese 
troops, there was practically no central government in Siam. Banditry 
was rampant, and rival petty kingdoms emerged in Nakhon Ratchashima, 
Sawangkhaburi, Phitsanulok and Nakhon Si Thammarat.  In this turmoil, as 
traditional historiography dictates, emerged Taksin as the kingdom’s savior. 
With a compelling personal charisma, Taksin united the Siamese people and 
established a new capital at Thonburi on the west bank of the Chao Phraya 
river and presently part of Bangkok Metropolitan Administration.
Born on 17 April 1734, Taksin’s birth name was Sin. The future king 
was unlike other aspiring leaders in the post-Ayutthayan period. Instead he 
was rather unique  not a scion of the old Ayutthayan royalty, but a governor 
and tax farmer of “an unimportant town (Tak)” with mixed Sino-Siamese 
ancestry  his mother was Siamese, while his father was a wealthy Teochiu tax 
farmer.4 During King Ekkathat (1758-1767), the last king of Ayutthaya, Sin 
was appointed Phraya Tak (Governor of Tak) 5, a small province in present-day 
Northern Thailand. It was in this position that Sin acquired his nom de guerre 
“Taksin”, which means, Sin from the Province of Tak. 
Taksin received his early education at Wat Kosowat, Ayutthaya. 
Besides Thai, he studied Chinese, Vietnamese and several Indian dialects. 
During his youth, Taksin came into close contact with Thong Duang, the 
future Rama I. Both Taksin and Thong Duang were reputedly prophesied by 
a Chinese fortune teller that they were extremely lucky and that both would 
be future kings. Before the fall of Ayutthaya, Taksin became famous in 1763 
and 1765 when he resisted the army of King Hsinbyushin of Ava (1763-1776), 
including turning back the Burmese marauders at Petchburi. 
However, in the siege of the capital in 1766 and 1767, Taksin opposed 
Ekkathat’s strategy to defend Ayutthaya. Seeing disaster ahead, Taksin took 
500 of his followers, broke through the Burmese lines, and established himself 
as a resistance leader in Rayong on the Eastern Seaboard. It was during this 
escape to Rayong and later Chanthaburi, Ayutthaya was sacked and anything 
of value was either looted or burnt to the ground.  The last king of Ayutthaya 
was never heard of again, and members of the royal family that survived the 
sacking were so discredited that there was no popular support for them.  It was 
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on the Eastern Seaboard that the Siamese began their regrouping under Taksin, 
and a new dynasty, the Kingdom of Thonburi was envisioned with Taksin as 
the new King of Siam.
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001 -2006)
Not unlike the 18th century King of Thonburi, former Prime Minister Thaksin 
came to power in 2001 along similar challenging conditions. While Taksin 
faced a destroyed Ayutthaya rampaged by the Burmese, Thaksin saw a different 
form of destruction. Then, Thailand experienced “economic destruction” 
caused by the pulling out of foreign investors. The rise of Thaksin came on the 
back of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis which left the kingdom in economic 
mess and tatters. Manufacturing jobs disappeared as foreigners fled with their 
capital. The construction and building boom that shaped the City of Angels 
or Bangkok in the early 1990s left only uncompleted buildings and dangling 
construction cranes. It was in these uncertainties that Thaksin rose to be Prime 
Minister of Thailand.
As the first Prime Minister born during the reign of previous King 
Bhumipol Adulyadej (1946-2016). Thaksin hails from a family of Hakka 
Chinese who migrated to Siam in the 19th century. Born in 1949 in Chiang 
Mai, Thaksin grew up in the north, entered police cadet training and upon 
graduation joined the Royal Thai Police at age 23.  He furthered his studies in 
Eastern Kentucky University and Houston University in the United States, and 
armed with a degree in criminal justice, Thaksin rose to become the Bureau 
Chief of the Royal Thai Police. 
In the 1980s, Thaksin quit his police job and started a business selling 
IBM computers in Thailand. Thaksin’s first clients were Chulalongkorn 
University and the State Railways of Thailand.6 Over the next three years, his 
clients included other government departments and state enterprises. Thaksin’s 
biggest break came in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the deregulation of 
the telecommunication industry. Thaksin’s first government concession was 
in 1987, when he secured the paging services in a joint venture with Pacific 
Telesis. In time, Thaksin’s flagship company became Shin Corp with vast 
interests in satellite and wireless communication. Before becoming Prime 
Minister, Thaksin was one of the kingdom’s wealthiest businessmen. (He 
became ever wealthier after becoming prime minister).
From the 1960s, Bangkok big businesses and businessmen have 
dominated Thailand’s parliamentary process. They finance elections and 
provide the funds for coalition building after the results of elections are 
announced. However, these businessmen are mainly aloof, preferring to remain 
behind the scenes, while pulling strings and securing privileges through formal 
and informal links.
Jebat  Volume 43 (2) (December 2016) Page | 146
Article: Clarence YK Ngui
In contrast, Thaksin was different.  Thaksin wanted to change 
Thai society. He wanted to convert the rural Thai poor peasantry into a new 
class of export-orientated and profit-maximising capitalists. With populist 
policies such as universal healthcare, debt moratorium for farmers and village 
development funds  until then, never seen before, the tycoon-leader broke the 
conventional political mould and raised great concerns with the reformers and 
conservatives. Thaksin’s business dealings and his family company of Shin 
Corp would eventually come back to haunt him in 2006.
Rising From The Ashes
Having looked into the personalities of Taksin and Thaksin, it is important to 
highlight how both leaders came to prominence in difficult times. In 1767, the 
old city of Ayutthaya was completely destroyed by the Burmese invaders. In 
the prevailing anarchy, Taksin abandoned the old capital, moved the capital to 
Thonburi and crowned himself there as King of Siam. In many ways, Taksin’s 
reign was seen as an interregnum. Without royal Ayutthaya bloodlines, Taksin 
had no traditional claims to rule. Instead, he had charisma, resembling the 
phumibhun or man of merit tradition who rose to power with wide popular 
support.  Taksin also used his Chinese connection  to be detailed in the next 
section to revive trade and generate revenue in the kingdom. In the first few 
years, Taksin fought various wars, he repelled the Burmese, subjugated the 
northern Thai Kingdom of Lanna, made alliances with the Lao principalities 
and forced the Cambodian king to pay tribute to Thonburi.
It is in similar tough conditions that saw Thaksin’s rise. The 1997 
Asian economic crisis highlighted Thailand’s dependency on international 
trade and investment as well as the fragility of the Thai economy. In the 1990s, 
as manufacturing profitability fell, the kingdom saw an unprecedented increase 
in real estate speculation. All this came to an end when Bangkok deregulated 
the domestic finance and dismantled foreign exchange controls. On 30 June 
1997, Bangkok floated the Thai baht due to the lack of foreign currency to 
support the US dollar peg. This led to a chain of events that made the kingdom 
effectively bankrupt. The International Monetary Fund stepped in with a rescue 
package of US$17 billion with conditions that Bangkok undertake massive 
regulatory reforms. 
Prior to the rise of Thaksin, Thai politics were fragmented, with 
politicians wheeling and dealing through short-lived coalition governments. 
This included Newin Chidchob and Banharn Silpa-archa, who passed away 
early 2016. These politicians were local leaders who controlled regional power 
blocs. Their parties tend to control a single province or region, where they hold 
most of the political offices and win most government contracts for the area. A 
fragmented political scene and the ravages of the Financial Crisis set partly the 
tone for Thailand’s 1997 constitution which brought a more decisive political 
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system and more stable political parties that inevitably lead to an empowered 
prime minister like Thaksin.
In 2001, Thaksin rode to his Prime Minister electoral victory as the 
first Thai politician to curry favour with the countryside  providing low-cost 
healthcare capped at 30 baht and debt forgiveness to a previously disenfranchised 
group of votes.7 Thaksin also  rode to power with Thai nationalism, promising 
Thailand will be a developed country and a future member of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  Like Taksin, Thaksin 
was Thailand’s saviour, bringing the Thai nation out of the crutches of the 
International Monetary Fund and all the ills of the financial crisis. Thaksin 
was seen as a nationalist response, both anti IMF and Anti Democrat Party. He 
made Thailand stand on its own feet. 
And for a while, Thailand became the darling of the world culminating 
in the successful Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in 2003 
and the 60th Year of the Accession To The Throne of King Rama IX Bhumipol 
Adulyadej in 2006. With fame-glam project such as “From Kitchen of the 
World” to “One Tamboon One Project (OTOP)”, Thaksin stamped Thailand’s 
position on the world’s map. Thaksin’s administration represented an ambitious 
government never before tried in Thai history. “Thaksinomics” and “CEOism” 
expounded Bangkok’s dual track policy of simultaneously pursuing export-
led industrialization, fueled by foreign direct investment and building the 
backbone of a domestic economy in the urban and rural areas. 8
Thaksin’s populism (pracha-niyom) gave his leadership some kind 
of saksit (sacred magic). His ability to bring progress and material benefit to 
millions of rural Thais in North and Northeast Thailand showed Thaksin was 
a phumibhun (man of merit). These arguments were perhaps the same reason 
used by Taksin in the 18th century to consolidate and legitimize his position.9 
The Thai’s concept of phumibhun is no different from Max Weber’s charismatic 
leadership, where both Taksin and Thaksin were endowed with a form of 
“extra-ordinary qualities” such as supernatural, superhuman and specifically 
exceptional powers or qualities that differ them from prevailing leaders. In the 
same Weberian framework, both eras of Taksin and Thaksin represented the 
charismatic leadership that brought social, political and economic changes. Of 
course, some were successful and some not so successful.
In 2005, Thaksin achieved the rarity of Thai politics his Thai Rak 
Thai (Thais Love Thais) became the first one-party in the kingdom’s history to 
achieve a parliamentary majority. Thaksin became the first elected Thai leader 
to serve a full term as prime minister since 1932. Yet, in the end, Thaksin’s 
dominant position made him more autocratic pushing far greater political 
control, which eventually came back to haunt the prime minister.
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Taksin and Thaksin: The Sino-Thai Dimension
In 1767, Taksin built up the fledging Siamese kingdom with the help of his 
Teochiu traders. In Chinese accounts, Taksin was also known as Zheng Xin (
鄭信 Tay Chao in Teochiu), his father was Zheng Yong (郑镛 Tay Hai Hong 
in Teochiu). Taksin sought to lay a stable resource base using the Teochiu 
economic and networking activities. Taksin encouraged Chinese migrants 
of his father’s speech-group because he was not in a position to command 
the native Siamese due to the sacking of Ayutthaya and the general chaos of 
that time. According to Henry Burney, King Taksin was commonly called the 
“Chinese King of Siam”. 10 In this particular sense, Taksin’s era was unique, as 
Chinghoo Chen wrote:
An unprecedented phenomenon during this period was a prevailing 
movement of Chinese immigrant groups, helping native rulers 
reclaim virgin lands, serving them as local governors, establishing 
their own settlements with autonomous governments, or even running 
an independent state.11
Taksin’s era typifies mainland Southeast Asian history’s lack of 
manpower. Thus, the possession and control of manpower was vital for a 
society’s survival. During Taksin’s reign, the Chinese supplied Siam’s much-
needed manpower because Siamese labourers and the members of the lower 
class were essentially monopolised by the upper class and free labour was non-
existent.12The Chinese coolies provided much- needed labour force to drain the 
marshy region of Chao Phraya delta and laying out new areas for cultivation 
plus providing artisans for the new capital. The Chinese engaged in trade and 
commerce occupations traditionally neglected by their Siamese counterparts 
who have engaged mainly in agricultural pursuits. The Chinese also operated 
export plantations, distilleries, refineries and the mines. 13
Taksin’s successor, King Rama I (1782-1809) continued the reliance 
on the Chinese.  The founding of Bangkok’s Grand Palace itself was built 
on land occupied by a rich Chinese merchant with the rank of Phraya. The 
Chinese Phraya and his community were asked to be transferred to the 
present-day Sampheng in Bangkok’s Chinatown.14 Rama I continued the Sino-
Siamese tributary trade, exchanging Siamese rice for Chinese luxury goods 
and crockery.15Then, the Sino-Siamese rice trade formed part of the tributary 
trade between Bangkok and Canton.16
The importance of Sino-Siamese trade and Chinese migration can 
be seen through the lucrative nature of this trade. These Chinese networks 
sustained the “money economy” of the Thonburi and the early Chakri Dynasty. 
During King Rama I’s reign, when the Deputy King (Uparaja) complained on 
insufficient allowance from the civil list in the 1780s, the king replied:
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Money collected in taxes from the people must first be used to run the 
country for their benefit, and only what was left over should be shared 
amongst the family. If the family needed more money then they had to 
buy and fit out junks for the trade with China.17
Indeed, during the first reign, the highest revenue came from the 
Chinese junk trade.18 Built in Siam, these Chinese junks were loaded with 
merchandise to be sold in China every year. Similar to Taksin’s era, besides 
the goods, the Chinese themselves became valuable import commodities.The 
influx of lower-class Chinese immigrants filled the need for manpower to build 
the new capital of Bangkok 19
In Southeast Asia, the Chinese in Thailand are probably considered 
the most assimilated. Except for brief periods in the 1920s to 1950s, the 
Chinese are treated well in Thailand. That is because the Chinese remained 
useful they made money  for themselves, the state, and the elite. How the 
Chinese were treated can be looked at how they were called. In the 1930s 
to the early 1960s, the term used for the Chinese was jek, considered rather 
derogatory in which the more urban Chinese find very distasteful. Since the 
1960s, the more neutral term lukjeen, which means son or child of a Chinese, 
has become more commonly acceptable. 
By the mid-20th century, the economy of Thailand was in the hands of 
the Sino-Thais. But the Chinese lack political influence  especially under the 
military governments since 1932. Ironically, many of these prime ministers such 
as Pridi Panomyong, Phraya Phahon Phonphayuhasena and Phibun Songkram. 
were partly Chinese themselves. In order to fit into a Thai nationalist scene, the 
Sino-Thais wanted their children to be more than businessmen. The rise of the 
Shinawatra family in the 20th century typifies the Chinese business families in 
Thailand. The Shinawatra children passed through the Thai education system, 
intermarried with the native Thais. In terms of the Chinese dimension, both 
Taksin and Thaksin revolutionalised how Chinese migrants became Thai but, 
in the same process, changed what “Thai” meant. It is within the Sino-Thai 
context that best describes the rise of the family of Thaksin Shinawatra.
As earlier mentioned, Thaksin has a close Chinese connection. The 
Shinawatra patriarch and Thaksin’s grandfather, Seng Saekhu (丘春盛  Qiū 
Chūnshèng) came from Meixian, the centre of Hakka elite in Guangdong 
Province in 1860. Seng became a gambling tax farmer in the small port of 
Chanthaburi on the eastern coast of the Gulf of Siam. Around 1908, Seng 
travelled to Chiang Mai and became a subsidiary tax farmer under Ma 
Nikhonphan (Luang Nikhon Jinkit), a major tax farmer in the Northern 
region.20 As more Chinese families adopted Thai names to fit into the kingdom, 
in 1938, Seng’s son adopted the name “Shinawatra”, which means “do good 
routinely”. This name became their family surname and the brand of their silk 
factory family business. By the time Thaksin was born, the Shinawatra family 
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was already one of the premier Sino-Thai commercial families of Chiang 
Mai. The family was also politically well-connected locally, Thaksin’s father 
was a Chiang Mai member of parliament, and another uncle runs the local 
government.
Similar to Taksin in the 18th century, in terms of foreign relations, 
when Thaksin became Prime Minister, he changed Thailand’s pro American 
policy which became the lynchpin since the 1960s to a more pro-Beijing 
partnership. In 2001, Thaksin picked China as the first foreign country to 
visit as Prime Minister, and in 2003, Beijing reciprocated the gesture when 
Hu Jiantao picked Thailand as his first foreign country to visit as President. 
Former diplomat-turned-academician, Pavin Chachavalpongpun wrote:- 
Thaksin attached great importance to solidifying economic linkages 
with China to the point where Bangkok often bent over backwards 
to avoid offending Beijing on a rage of political issues. Thaksin also 
signed the Sino-Thai Free Trade agreement, the first between China 
and an ASEAN country, and the first Sino-Thai joint naval exercise in 
the Gulf of Thailand in 2005.21
Between 1996 and 2006, Thailand-China trade grew five-fold 
several times faster than Bangkok’s trade with the rest of the world.22 Chinese 
investment in Thailand alongside with Bangkok-Beijing military links in 
terms of military hardware has also grown significantly. Bangkok-Beijing 
security cooperation is an interesting development in the regional context, as 
the kingdom has been the US lynchpin in the region with Bangkok supplying 
troops in US military efforts in the Korean War, Vietnam War and the 1991 
Persian Gulf War. Thaksin changed Bangkok’s traditional reliance on the US 
as the provider of peace and security of the kingdom.  
Since Thaksin’s removal, it is unclear if his replacement, the 
Democratic Party Abhisit Vejjajiva and subsequent military governments 
would have done things differently with China. That is because, after the 
removal of Yingluck Shinawatra in May 2014, China remained an important 
partner of Thailand. Unlike Washington DC, Beijing rarely asked too many 
“political questions.” Yet, it is clear that Bangkok-Beijing ties lack the personal 
touch of Thaksin. In March 2016, Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-o-
cha announced the cancellation of a US$15.7 billion Thai-China high speed 
railway, linking Bangkok through Laos to Southern China. Instead, the high-
speed line will end at Nakhon Ratchasima, some 400km short of the Lao 
border. The deal was considered one of the biggest infrastructure stimulus 
since the 19th century and highlights concerns for the once special Bangkok-
Beijing relationship. 
In most aspects of daily life of ordinary Thais, contact with China 
remain a distant memory. But the “Chineseness” of the Sino-Thai remains an 
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important question. Benedict Anderson in his last journal article before he died 
in 2016 attributed the current political mess in Thailand, as a rivalry between 
the various Chinese groups in Thailand, the Hakkas led by Thaksin Shinawatra, 
the Hokkiens by Abhisit Vejjajiva, the Hainanaese by Sodhi Limthongkul 
and the Teochius  by the ruling royal family and their scions.23Thus, when 
discussing Taksin and Thaksin, the Chinese dimension of old Siam and modern 
Thailand is one aspect that cannot be ignored.
 
Taksin: The Fall, Myth-Making, Spirit Mediums and Nostalgia
Taksin’s exit has always been controversial. That is because the fall of Taksin led 
to the establishment of the present Chakri dynasty. Traditional historiography 
writes that on April 7, 1782, a day after Rama I marched into Bangkok, Taksin 
was declared insane and removed via a coup d’état. An appeal to save Taksin’s 
life by allowing the former king’s request to join the Buddhist monkhood was 
ignored. Instead, the King of Thonburi was sealed in a velvet sack and beaten 
to death with a scented sandalwood club, in accordance with an old Ayutthayan 
tradition that calls for no royal blood to touch the ground.
Conservative Thai historiography, described the closing days of 
Taksin as filled with political instability with rebellions breaking out in vassal 
states and outlying border provinces. These sources explained the later years 
of Taksin were coloured by the king’s pronounced eccentricities. French 
missionaries in Siam wrote all is not well with the King as, ‘he flogged hundreds 
of men who refused to acknowledge the King’s superiority as a sottapana (a 
Buddhist stream winner or a Buddhist Saint.’ Klaus Wenk, the most prominent 
western scholar on Rama I, wrote:
The question whether Rama I welcome the fall of Taksin, either for 
personal or political reasons and, if so, to what extent, is beyond 
the scope for historical investigation, and is of purely speculative 
nature.24
What is agreeable to most historical sources is that the closing days of 
Taksin’s reign were far from perfect. But, was the removal of Taksin untimely? 
In the 18th century, the elites, the Bunnags, the Brahmans and the Chinese 
trading families came to a consensus and wanted Taksin to be replaced. Their 
reason of the king’s removal was “for the good of all, for the fate of Buddhism, 
and for the future of Siam”. This tagline is a little too familiar, as it is reused 
to call for Thaksin’s removal in 2006. Today, this debate continues, especially 
among the Red Shirt supporters of Thaksin. As much as Taksin and Thaksin’s 
era have become pages of history, the main question that remains is how should 
history judge personalities? 
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Despite the confusion of Taksin’s departure, the nostalgia surrounding 
the former king of Thonburi is alive and well remembered in Thailand. Not long 
after his sad ending, the founder of the new dynasty, Rama I sponsored a royal 
cremation for Taksin. The sole King of Thonburi is the only one of a handful 
of Thai kings to receive the glorious Maharach or Great King titles albeit post-
humously. Marxist Thai writer and former diplomat, Supha Sirimanon even 
immortalized Taksin into a novel, questioning the authenticity of the records 
of the king’s death and whether he actually led a quiet life “after his so-called 
death”.25 Supha’s novel is perhaps an early attempt in the making of Taksin’s 
nostalgia  questioning the traditional historiography of the king’s removal. This 
novel provided a one of the earlier halo to Taksin’s reign, especially when the 
author tried to closely connect the former king with Buddhism monasticism, a 
pillar of the kingdom. 
In recent times, Taksin’s nostalgia elevated the former king into a 
subject of popular devotionalism among the general public. A cult such as 
Taksin’s is not too surprising in an era of royalist revivalism. Monarchic 
cults especially of King Chulalongkorn remains a fascinating interest in Thai 
Studies. Irene Stengs’s work on Worshipping the Great Moderniser: King 
Chulalongkorn, Patron Saint of the Middle Class is perhaps a rare academic 
study on the cultural and religious significant of ethnographic study on the 
cult of royal and Buddhist religiousity. However, Taksin’s devotionalism is 
an anomaly more akin to other devotional cults such as Luang Pho Khoon, 
Ganesh and Jatukam Ramathep. Glorifying Taksin is an anti-thesis to the 
legitimacy of the present Chakri Dynasty. This concern is important because, if 
a king of the previous dynasty is given glorification, it will only raise questions 
of the legitimacy of the establishment of the present dynasty. The only other 
non-Chakri Siamese monarch that became cult of royal veneration is King 
Naresuan (Prince Suphankalaya is the other pre-Chakri Siamese royalty that 
has received some form of popular veneration). Perhaps, the usefulness of 
these cults also emphasized another point they defended Siam from Burma, 
and thus a useful tool of state nationalism. 
These days, on Asahna Bucha night, it is believed, Taksin returns to 
Thailand, standing up on his throne hoisting a shield and a sword. Without 
detailing into khon song (mediums), but without fail, every December 28  the 
anniversary of Taksin’s Coronation  Thais pay homage to Taksin’s equestrian 
statue at Wongwian Yai in Thonnburi. The statue of Taksin was erected in 
1953 under the direction of Phibun Songkram, a prime minister of Thaksin-
like strongman qualities. Phibun’s choice of a non-Chakri monarch was seen 
as competing with the king, and developing an alternative source of political 
legitimacy for his prime-ministership.26 Interestingly too, Phibun may have 
shared a similar fate to Taksin and Thaksin when the former was deposed 
in a military coup in 1958. Unlike Thaksin, Phibun accepted his fate, retired 
in Penang and later died in Japan in 1964. In other words, unlike Thaksin, 
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Phibun virtually faded into the pages of history, without attempting to regain 
his prime-ministership. 
Yet not all royalists are agreeable on the making of Taksin’s nostalgia. 
They countered, Taksin’s violent demise served to illustrate how leaders 
who abused their authority may be replaced by men of superior merit.27 But, 
Taksin’s nostalgia will remain forever somewhat mixed. In the 2015 Rajabhakti 
Park in Hua Hin, a historical theme park honouring past Thai kings, despite 
having mixed legacies, Taksin received the rare honour in the form of one 
of the seven giant statues  which include King Ramkhamhaeng (1279-1298) 
of Sukhothai, King Naresuan (1590-1605) and King Narai (1656-1688) of 
Ayutthaya, and King Rama I (1782-1809), King Mongkut (1851-1868) and 
King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) of the present day Chakri Dynasty.   
Thaksin: The Fall, Rise Again and The Making of Nostalgia
Fast foward from two centuries from Taksin’s sudden removal in 1782, 
Thaksin’s fall came as no surprise on 19 September 2006. Similar to Taksin, 
Thaksin was unceremoniously removed on a cold night. The military coup 
was greeted with resentment by some and with joy, relief and hope by others. 
Thaksin’s unmaking was expected. Months before his removal, Thaksin and 
the military were in a somewhat shadow boxing match. As much as Thaksin 
was the most popular prime minister in electoral polls, his government was also 
very controversial. From the start, Thai scholar, Michael Montesano warned:
Thaksin’s brashness and outspoken determination to reshape the Thai 
political order, his unabashed plutocracy and utter insouciance about 
glaring conflicts of interests, and his persistent unwillingness to make 
adjustments necessary to veil his disreputability always involved real 
risks. 28
Cronyism and flagrant self-interest was Thaksin’s flaw. In 2004, just into the 
third year of Thaksin’s government, Thaksin allowed his then 23-year old son 
Panthongtae Shinawatra How Come Co Ltd to obtain advertising contracts from 
state-run Bangkok Metro, the subway operator of the capital city. 29 Thaksin’s 
strong leadership created a new political economy network which linked the 
military, bureaucratic, political and capitalist elements. This network, though 
bourgeoning was still somewhat weak in 2006, but has begun to rival that of 
former Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda and the Royal Family. 
Other controversies include Thaksin’s strong-handed war on drugs 
in his first term in office. Officially launched in February 2003, the first three 
months saw 2,275 extrajudicial killings, which the government blamed largely 
on gangs involved in the drug trade.30 Then, the question on the war on drugs, 
was the effectiveness on a quick fix to the drug epidemic, and at what cost? 
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Worse still, the war on drugs was exploited to intimate human right defenders 
with violence and arbitrary arrest on anyone connected to the drug trade. In 
addition, from January 2004 to September 2006, more than 1,200 people had 
died in the Southern Thai insurgency. Indeed, Thaksin’s last days in power 
were not so smooth-flowing. His early economic and political success became 
increasingly questionable. Despite winning elections by landslide margins and 
achieving early widespread popularity, Thaksin’s monopolistic and autocratic 
policies have angered many.
The climax of anti-Thaksin began in January 2006 when he sold the 
family’s company, Shin Corp to Singapore’s state-owned Temasek in a tax-
free US$2 billion deal. Critics howled at the tax-free sale and the disposal of a 
strategic national asset to a foreign country. According to Montesano, the sale 
of Shin Corp, was perhaps the moment when Thaksin “stumbled and fallen 
his high-wire act”.31 Using the Shin Corp sale as the main bait, the protest 
movement was led by Sonthi Limthongkul, a maverick media entrepreneur 
and former business associate of Thaksin. Interestingly, Sonthi’s Putchakan 
(Manager) was earlier credited as successfully moulding Thaksin’s political 
image and acumen. However, the two fell out rather badly. Sonthi initially 
used his media to criticize Thaksin. From a trickle, Sonthi drew large crowds 
that number in their thousands. This protest movement dubbed themselves the 
“Yellow Shirts”  used the birth colour of the previous monarch.32 By January 
2006, up to 100,000 Thais led by Sonthi were marching or camping out 
regularly at Sanam Luang to voice their protest against Thaksin.
After the military coup of 2006, the junta immediately cancelled 
the scheduled October 2006 election and promised new elections in a year. 
In order to show that the coup was “special”, civilian ruled was restored on 
1 October 2006, ironically to a retired military general, Surayud Chulanont. 
The appointed civilian government main task was to remove Thaksin from 
Thai politics. Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party was dissolved in May 2007 with 
some 111 party members banned from contesting elections for five years. The 
interim government also hunted Thaksin’s wealth with the Assets Examinations 
Committee freezing some 21 bank accounts belonging to the former prime 
minister and his family containing about B53 billion. Another B20 billion was 
also in search.33
Nonetheless, almost immediately after the military coup, the making 
of “Thaksin nostalgia” began. Having never been a Thaksin supporter, Pravit 
Rojanaphruk of The Nation, wrote “It is actually preferable to live under 
Thaksin Shinawatra than under a military junta”. For Pravit, nostalgia for 
Thaksin included some degree of democracy over no democracy under the 
junta and Thaksin’s CEO can do attitude being replaced by a military junta not 
accountable at all to the public. 34 
Despite the military efforts to erase Thaksin, in December 2007, 
Thaksin made a quasi-return via a general election victory. While remaining 
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in exile, Thaksin-linked’s People’s Power Party (Phak Palang Prachachon) 
secured a plurality, winning 233 out of 480 seats in the first general elections 
since the 2006 coup. Thaksin’s main opponent, the Democratic Party won 165 
seats. PPP’s Samak Sundaravej was appointed Prime Minister of Thailand, 
but he lasted only from January to September 2008. Ironically, Thailand’s 
Constitutional Court removed Samak on the excuse the prime minister 
appeared as a paid-TV chef, as it is unconstitutional for a government minister 
to hold any other paying job. 
In September 2008, Samak was replaced briefly by Somchai 
Wongsawat, Thaksin’s brother-in-law. Somchai himself was also removed by 
the Constitutional Court, which also banned the People’s Power Party. The 
final blow to Thaksin’s proxies culminated via a “parliamentary coup” on 17 
September 2008. The vote in parliament saw several Thaksin allies switching 
sides which brought the Democratic Party to power. Then, Abhisit Vejajiva 
won 298 against 163 in the parliamentary vote of no-confidence.
In concurrent to the soft tactics like judicial rulings and parliamentary 
coup, many strong handed tactics were used by Thaksin’s opponents, 
including the People’s Alliance for Democracy occupation and closing of 
the Government House in Bangkok, Suvarnabhumi Airport and Don Meuang 
Aiport in Bangkok in August-September 2008. The PAD also closed three 
regional airports  Phuket, Hat Yai and Krabi and halted some 35 trains from 
the provinces to Bangkok.
In May 2010, Democratic Party prime minister Abhisit oversaw the 
biggest and bloodiest crackdown at Ratchaprasong after a two month siege 
of Bangkok by the Red Shirts2. Unlike the Yellow Shirts’ s street protest that 
managed to bring the Samak and Somchai’s Thaksin-proxy government to a 
complete standstill, Abhisit resorted to a military crackdown. The use of force 
saw 91 people killed and thousands injured. It was also the day when Bangkok 
“burned”  reminiscent of how Ayutthaya was burned to the ground during the 
Burmese siege in 1767.
In spite of using every trickery in the book, the military junta and the 
Democratic Party have failed to oust Thaksin’s influence.  In 2011, Thaksin 
made his second comeback via the new Pheu Thai Party (For Thais Party). Led 
by Thaksin’s youngest sister, Yingluck Shinawatra won the general election 
using the slogan “Thaksin kid, Pheu Thai tham” (Thaksin thinks, and Pheu 
Thai acts). She won 265 seats out of the 500-seat parliament, a landslide by 
Thai political standards. 
For at least the first year, Yingluck’s policy of prongdong 
(reconciliation) appeared to have been successful. Her downfall came after 
she proposed a general amnesty for all politically motivated incidents since 
2006. The amnesty plan, which include a pardon for Thaksin, fueled protestors 
back to the streets, this time under People’s Democratic Reform Committee led 
by former Democrat Party MP, Suthep Thaugsuban. In the end, Yingluck was 
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removed in a military coup by General Prayuth Chan-o-cha in May 2014. As 
of time of writing, Yingluck is attending court trials on charges of corruption 
linked to the rice subsidy scheme. She has denied the charges.
After seven years of Thaksin’s first removal in 2006, he remains 
popular in Thailand’s north and northeast, but is loathed by the elites of 
Bangkok. Despite the Yellow Shirts’ desperate call for a “Yud rabob Thaksin” 
(Stop the Thaksin system), Thaksin has won every general election in Thailand 
since 2001. Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai and its incarnation, Pheua Thai (For 
Thais) won the elections of 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2011 – despite all the charges 
of corruption, human rights abuses and vote buying against Thaksin. Yet, 
every Thaksin-linked government since 2006 has been removed via dubious 
judicial rulings or military coups that have the support of the wealthy Bangkok 
establishment.36
Since 2006, Thaksin has largely lived in exile. He returned briefly 
during Samak’s administration in February 2008, but was forced into exile in 
August that year, when his wife Potjaman Na Pombejra was found guilty of 
tax evasion and sentenced to three years in jail. On October 21 2008, Thaksin 
was found guilty of abuse of power and conflict of interest for helping his wife 
purchase land in Bangkok from a state agency in 2003, and sentenced to a two- 
year jail term. Nonetheless, this “fugitive of the law” remains influential and 
very rich. Thaksin is ranked No 1121 richest in the world with a net worth of 
US$1.64 billion.37 In the eyes of the royalists, Thaksin’s refusal to accept his 
removal in 2006 and Yingluck’s removal in 2014 underscores the evil nature 
of a man determined to subvert, in the name of vanity and greed, the laws of 
nature upon which the nation’s socio-political order is founded. 38 
Since 2005, anti-Thaksin groups such as the People’s Alliance for 
Democracy (2005-2008), the Council for National Security (2006-2007), the 
People’s Democratic Reform Council (2013-2014) and the National Council 
of Peace and Order (since 2014) have portrayed Thaksin as the source of 
Thailand’s corruption medley. Ironically, in 2015, the military government was 
itself embroiled in one of the largest corruption scandal, the earlier-mentioned 
Rajabhakti Park. Built at a cost of one billion Thai Baht (US$28 million), 
and in dedication and loyalty to the monarchy, the park saw large portion of 
donations were diverted, and donated palm trees were quoted at B300,000 
each.39 Several military officials linked to the project have also mysteriously 
disappeared and died.
Conclusions
Today, Taksin’s rise and fall in the 18th century have been relegated to the pages 
of history. His fall brought to the present Chakri Dynasty, of which Rama 
I brought an era of unrivalled prosperity in Siam. The Chakris contributed 
the most progressive kings of the kingdom, Mongkut (1851-1868) and 
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Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), which were credited as one of the most important 
reasons why the kingdom escaped western colonialism. As they say, men and 
kings can only be judged by historians but the wheels of history will keep 
on turning. Despite being of a previous dynasty, Taksin’s legacy in Thailand 
is somewhat mixed but overwhelmingly positive in rebuilding the kingdom 
after the fall of Ayutthaya. Perhaps, the best proof of Taksin’s nostalgia are the 
colossal statues of Taksin at Wongwian Yai, Thonburi, Rajabhakti Park, Hua 
Hin and Chantaburi. Thus, with numerous statues and various commemoration 
of the Thonburi Kingdom, Taksin’s nostalgia has been secured. 
If Taksin, the King of Thonburi made his comeback via the building of 
remembrance statues, can Thaksin of the 21st century make a comeback? Indeed, 
2017 will be rough for Thailand.  History should judge Thaksin no differently. 
While, it is doubtful there would ever be a statue in Thaksin’s honour,40 the day 
will come for Thaksin to be viewed for his contribution to the Thai society. As 
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, political scientist at Chulalongkorn University, puts 
it so succinctly, ‘Thaksin’s loyalists are not to be underestimated. They are 
everywhere, in the police, in the military. And, you know, Thaksin has many 
people in the countryside who support him’.
Many of Thaksin’s loyalists such as Somkid Jatusripitak (a co-
founder of Thai Rak Thai) who held commerce and finance positions during the 
Thaksin’s era, are in the present military government of Prayuth Chan-orcha. 
Many elements of “Thaksinomics” of economic liberalism to attract foreign 
capital and populist domestic program to attract broad domestic support are 
still in place in the current military junta. For now at least, Thaksin’s pages 
of history are incomplete with a lot of rewriting and editing. History will 
remember Thaksin for winning four general elections by larger margins than 
any other leader in the kingdom’s democratic history. Even if an election is 
held soon, it will not be a panacea for the kingdom’s problems, as history 
will also remember the long emotional campaign that drove Thaksin out of 
power that totally polarized the kingdom.  To sum up, the making of Thaksin’s 
nostalgia has begun, but remains uncertain of its final outcome. 
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